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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEVERLY R. BUXTON, 
Applicant I Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 15802 
ST AT EMENT OF THE NA TU RE OF THE CASE 
This is an application o'f the Applicant/Appellant, Beverly R. Buxton 
against the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah for a determina-
' 
tion of benefits from the provisions of the Special Fund for compensation 
as a result of permanent and total disability sustained as a result of an 
industrial injury. 
The parties will be referred to herein as "Applicant" and "Respondent". 
All references to "the record" will simply be to a page number of the 
Indusrial Commission file. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Applicant filed her formal claim seeking relief and compensation 
from the Special Fund with the Industrial Commission on May 8, 1975, 
After a hearing on October 14, 1975 the Industrial Commission entered 
its Order denying Applicant's claim for permanent total disability bene-
fits on December 12, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Applicant seeks to have the decision of the Industrial Commission 
reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Applicant Beverly R. Buxton slipped in a puddle of water at the 
place of her employment and injured her back February 16, 1966. Her 
original claim for compensation with the Industrial Commission was 
filed January 16, 1967. As a result of her injury, Dr. A. F. Martin 
performed a spinal fusion on July of 1966. Her original attending physi-
cian attested to her disability at 15 per cent, but later changed his mind 
and gave her a rating of 10 per cent permanent partial disability as a 
result of the industrial injury. Due to a pre-existing condition Applicant 
underwent a hip arthroplasty in January of 1967 and later a hip fusion in 
October of 1967. The hip surgery was not a result of her industrial 
accident. A medical panel was appointed and assessed a rating for per· 
manent partial disability based upon the spinal injury of 10 per cent 
- 2 -
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which order was affirmed by the Industrial Commission January 16, 
1968 (R. 64, 68). The record discloses that Dr. A. F. Martin per-
formed further surgery on her lower spine some time in August of 
1968; presumably this is related to the industrial injury (R. 128), 
Applicant filed her application for additional compensation 
on August 7, 1968 (R. 77) as a result of continual complaints, pain 
and suffering relating to her back injury. In response to this applica-
tion, the insurance carrier agreed to further medical treatment, test-
ing and the like. Further surgery was undertaken and her lower back 
was re-explored in August of 1968 (R. 128), 
Applicant filed her application for additional compensation on 
June 2, 1969 (R. 89) to which the carrier agreed to further testing and 
treatment, As a result of the carrier's agreement to payment of medi-
cal expenses and further treatment, the claim was not acted upon by 
the Industrial Commission wit.h respect to an increase in the assess-
ment of permanent partial disability. On June 18, 1969 a Neurosurgeon, 
Dr. Stoops, performed a chordotomy in order to relieve the pain and 
suffering characterized by Applicant's continuing medical problems 
(R. 100), On December 31, 1969 a rather drastic surgical procedure 
was undertaken where Dr. Stoops performed a rhizotomy in order to 
relieve p1in applicant was suffering (R. 100-101), Applicant's history 
to date is summirized in D::, Henrie's letter to the Industrial Commis-
sion as follows: 
- 3 -
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"This patient has had eighteen previous hospitali-
zations and multiple surgical procedures including a 
chordotomy and rhizotomy. She has persistent pain 
in the lumbar area, most likely on the basis of fib-
rosis and adhesive capsulitis of the facetal joints, 
residual defect in paraesthesias related to the pre-
vious neurosurgical procedures with the most distress-
ing symptoms being those of bladder and bowel dis -
function and dyspareunia. 11 (R. 102) 
Applicant filed her application for additional compensation 
October 13, 1970 in the form of a letter, (R. 106) and the matter was 
referred to a new medical panel for a permanent partial disability 
rating. Based upon the medical panel1s report of January 26, 1971 
and their examination of the Applicant and the records involved in the 
case, they awarded Applicant a permanent partial disability rating of 
40 per cent which rating was affirmed by the Industrial Commission 
Order filed April 19, 1971. (R. 147, 148) 
At this point Applicant received payment in full from the insur-
ance carrier with respect to the new permanent partial disability rating 
and for perioas of permanent partial disability. The carrier also paid 
medical expenses incurred as a result of her industrial accident. It 
was at this point in time that the insurance carrier began to refuse to 
honor medical expenses incurred as a result of Applicant's continuing 
problems and on this basis Applicant filed her application for deterrnina-
tio:i of medical expense and such other and further relief as is just with 
- 4 -
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the Commission on January 14, 1972 (R.. 175, 176). 
Based upon said ap?lication, the parties agreed, after informal 
bearing as to the extent of medical expenses and continuing problems 
suffered by the Applicant. 
As a result of this informal meeting, the Commission sum-
marized the medical procedure to be followed in its Order dated 
December 20, 1972 (R. 195 ). 
As of the date of the Industrial Commission's Order, December 
20, 1972, it was apparent that Applicant's condition was deteriorating 
as a result of her industrial injury but that the physician's involved 
could not recommend any specific surgical procedure. The carrier 
recommended that a third medical panel be appointed on or about 
September 18, 1973 (R.. 204) to which Applicant objected in the form 
of a letter to the Commission October 8, 1973 (R. 209). 
Applicant continued to .·suffer problems concerning her medical 
situation and this continual dispute with the insurance carrier with 
respect to medical payments resulted in Applicant filing another formal 
ap?lication for award and for attorney's fees with the Commission 
July 11, 1973 (R. 201). 
The record indicates that the Industrial Commission had con-
tinuing involvement with this case from the date of injury through 
- 5 -
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succeeding six years and it cannot be disputed that during the period 
of this time Applicant was suffering continued deterioration in her 
medical condition. This is evidenced by the fact that by January 14, 
1972 Applicant had filed five applications for compensation and such 
other and further relief as is just with the Industrial Commission. 
Applicant's seventh formal application for relief was filed 
with the Industrial Commission on September 7, 1973 (R. 201) after the 
sixth anniversary of her date of injury. In response to that application 
the Industrial Commission considered her continuing medical problems 
and made an informal determination with respect to the payment of 
medical expenses incurred as a result thereof (R. 232). 
Finally, Applicant filed her formal claim seeking relief and 
compensation from the Special Fund with the Industrial Commission 
on May 8, 1975 (R. 259). As a result of said application, a hearing 
was held before the Industrial Comrnission with all parties present 
and represented by and through their counsel, testimony was adduced 
. and Dr. Wayne Hebertsen testified pursuant to subpoena on behalf of 
the Applicant to the effect that the Applicant was one hundred per cent 
totally and permanently disabled and that said disability resulted from 
the industrial accident of February 16, 1966. (R. 255). It is note-
worthy that a response to Applicant's application for total disability 
- 6 -
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benefits was never entered nor was the statute of limitations raised 
by counsel for the Special Fund. More than two years after the 
hearing which was held October 14, 1975, the Industrial Commission 
entered its Order deaying Applicant's claim for permanent total dis-
ability benefits. {R. 316, 317) 
ARGUMENT 
The basis for the Administrative Law Judge's disallowing any 
further awards seemed to be threefold; (1) that the testimony adduced 
at the hearing failed to reflect that Applicant's con:iition had deteriorated 
since the second medical panel rendered its rating, (2) that there was 
a failure to delineate the cause of the deterioration, if any, from the 
industrial injury and from pre-existing conditions and, (3) that, in 
any event, the Commission was without jurisdiction to hear the case 
because more than six years had elapsed. 
Applicant takes issue with this reasoning as follows: 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO CONFLICT IN THE TESTIMONY THAT APPLICANT 
IS PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY DISABLED. 
Review of the record and the testimony given by Dr. Hebertsen 
demo::istrates that the Applicant was permanently and totally disabled 
(R. 282). 
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Reference to Dr. Hebertsen1 s testimony is clear that the 
contributing factor in the Applicant's total disability is the scarring 
and nerve disfunction contributed to in part by the many surgical 
procedures involved in simply trying to help the .Applicant. The 
following testimony is extracted from the record: 
Q. The total disability which we have discussed, in 
your opinion is that related to the scarring and the block-
age in the lumbarsacral area that we have discussed? 
A. I think that the disability is not only due to the 
difficulty she has in the lumbosacral region, but also 
the difficulty which she has in terms of pain in the 
dorsal region, and the deficits which have resulted as 
a result of her chordotomy procedure in the dorsal 
region. 
Q. Tell us what is a chordotomy? 
A. A chordotomy is a partial cutting of the spinal cord, 
in which nerves that have to do with the conduction of 
pain sensation and also texture sensation, are severed, 
disconnecting them so-to-speak from a painful area of 
the body to the brain, and hopefully relieving pain on 
that basis. And, at the same time, preserving the 
ability of the patient to appreciate touch and to move. 
Q. Would you define it as a radical procedure? 
A. I think it is a radical type of pain relieving proce-
dure (R. 294, 295) 
The fact that A pfJlicant had been before the Commission, by 
separate application, two times subsequent to the medical panel's 
finding would demonstrate that her disability had increased. 
- 8 -
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POINT II 
TOTAL DISABILITY MAY BE A COMBINATION OF ALL 
CAUSES. 
It is respectfully submitted that under the Special Fund pro-
visions and the statute creating a remedy for total disability it is 
entirely immaterial whether or not the total disability results from 
the natural deterioration ot the pre-existing conditions or the progres-
sion of the residuals of the industrial accident or a combination of 
both, 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-69(1) (1953) provides in 
part as follows: 
11 (1) If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity by accidentalinjury, disease, 
or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury 
for which compensation and medical care is provided 
by this title that results in permanent incapacity 
which is substantially greater than he would have in-
curred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, 
compensation and medical care, which medical care 
and other related items are outlined in Section 35-1-81, 
shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, 
but the liability of the employer for such compensation 
and medical care shall be for the industrial injury only 
and the remainder shall be paid out of the special fund 
provided for in Section 35-1-68(1) hereinafter referred 
to as the "special fund", 
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medi-
cal panel set forth in Section 35-2-56, shall review all 
medical aspects of the case and determine first, the 
total permanent physical impairment resulting from 
- 9 -
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all causes and conditions including the industrial 
injury; seco:id, the percentage of permanent 
physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
injury; and third, the percentage of permanent 
physical impairment attributable to previously 
existing conditions whether due to accidental injury, 
disease or congenital causes. The Industrial Com-
mission shall then assess the liability for compen-
sation and medical care to the employer on the basis 
of the percentage o: permanent physical impairment 
attributable to the industrial injury only and the 
remainder shall be payable out of the said special 
fund. Amounts, if any, which have been paid by 
the employer in excess of the portion attributable 
to the said industrial injury shall be reimbursed to 
the employer out of said special fund. 11 
Sec. 31-1-69(1), Utah Code Annotated. 
It is thus apparent from the statute that a person who has 
become totally and permanently disabled should be compensated even 
if part of that disability is or may be attributed to a pre-existing con-
dition not the result of an industrial accident. 
One of the conditions precedent for awarding disability on the 
basis of total incapacity from the Special Fund is a finding after refer· 
ence by the Utah State Department of Vocational Rehabilitation that the 
Ap?licant has applied for vocatio:ial rehabilitation and cooperated with 
the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. In this case Applicant did 
make such application with a finding and response from the Divisio;iof 
Rehabilitation' that the A ;_Jplicant was at the time and still is unfeasible 
for rehabilitation services (R. 254). 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION DOES NOT LOSE JURISDICTION IN A CASE 
AFTER THE PASSING OF SIX YEARS, OR EIGHT YEARS IN THIS CASE 
- 10 -
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The Commission determined that a six year period of limita-
tions and the interpretation thereon as set forth in the U, S, Smelting 
v. Nielsen, 20 Utah 2d 271, 437 P. 2d 199 (1968) and Kennecott v. 
Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P. 2d 217 (1973) would govern the 
present case. 
Applicant takes issue with said determination on three basis: 
(1) The entire record in this proceeding seems to.:justify the fact that 
the Commissions 1 continuing jurisdiction should be allowed where 
Applicant 1s claim was asserted within a reasonable time inasmuch as 
her claim of many complaints were co'ntinual, continuing and the subject 
matter of eight separate applications filed during the course of the 
proceedings thereupon giving all parties clear and adequate notice of 
her deteriorating conditio::i, (2) although the statutes are repleat with 
a strict limitation of 312 weeks with respect to the insurance carrier's 
liability, there is no such limitation to be found anywhere in the Special 
Fund statute. To imply such a limitation in the provisions of the 
Special Fund legisl<i:tion would be repugnant on the face ot the legisla-
tion to its purpose. The Special Fund provisions provide for payment 
to perso::is suffering a total disability and go on to add that in no case 
will the employer or the insurance carrier be liable for any payments 
which wo:ild exceed a six year period, Section 35-1-67 (1953) Utah 
Code Annotated, Implied within the statutory provision therefore, 
would seem that the statute contemplates payment of claims for perso:is 
- 11 -
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who are totally disabled for indefinite periods if necessary, and (3) 
subsequent to the decision in U. S. Smelting v. Nielsen, supra., the 
Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (Supp. 
1977) to provide for an eight year limitation period. The statute pro-
vides in part as follows: 
The Commission may make a permanent partial disability 
award at any time prior to eight years after the date of 
injury to any employee whose physical condition resulting 
from such injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years 
after the date of injury and who files 'an application for 
such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight year 
period. " 
A !though the statute provides to cases of permanent partial 
disability rather than total disability, nevertheless applicant, in this 
case, filed a formal application with the Commission January 14, 1972 
praying for determination of liability for n1edical expense and for such 
other and further relief as is proper. (R. 175, 176) Applicant suffered 
continuing difficulties when subsequent application for award was filed 
with the Industrial Commission July 11, 1973 requesting that medical 
expenses presently due and owing be determined and further for an award 
of attorney 1 s fees in connection with the bringing of the application (R. 201) 
which application was supplemented by letters to the Commission of July 
17, 1974 (R. 234) and November 22, 1974 (R. 240). Although not speci-
fically praying for a determination of further award for permanent total 
- l 7 -
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disability, all parties to the proceeding were on specific notice that 
Applicant's problems were deteriorating and serious as evidenced by 
Dr. Hebertsen's letter to the Commission as a result of the application 
filed within the six year period (R. 190). 
It should be further noted that the application filed July 11, 1973, 
and while Applicant's claim was still alive and as supplemented November 
22, 1974 was made within the eight year period of limitations and made 
specific suggestion that the Applicant was claiming benefits for total 
disability. (R. 241) 
This Court has given retrospective application to the amended 
limitation statute in Del Monte Corp. v. Moore (Supreme Court of Utah, 
1978, Docket No. 15218) which clearly gives the Industrial Commission 
jurisdiction in this case even assuming the limitation applies to permanent 
total disability cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony adduced at the hearing is clear that the Applicant 
is totally and permanently disabled and that her disability is a result of 
the industrial accident. 
Whether or not her disability is contributed by the pre-existing 
hip condition is immaterial under the statute. 
The Industrial Commission retains continuing jurisdiction of total 
disability cases; Applicant is within the eight year limitation based on 
- 13 -
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the applications filed with tbe Commission of January 14, 1972 and 
July 11, 1973. 
This Court has given retrospective application to the limitation 
statute for cases of permanent partial disability in Del Monte Co:i:. 
v. Moore, supra, even assuming that statute applies to cases for 
total permanent disability. 
Based upon the foregoing the judgment and decision of the 
Industrial Commission should be reversed. 
11J{t;L 
jtr;N R. ANDERSON 
v Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent 
1100 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Applicant/ Appellant 
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Frank V. Nelson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for 
Defendant/Respondent, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this 19th day of June, 1978. 
l Anderson Attorney for Applicant/Appellant 
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